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OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14374

v.

WALLACE MURPHY PLUM,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant-appellant Plum appeals from a verdict
of guilty before a jury, tried the 3rd and 4th of December,
1975 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall
presiding, whereafter, he was sentenced to a term of one
to fifteen years in the Utah State Penitentiary.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal, appellant seeks to have the verdict
reversed and the case dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 3rd day of July, 1975, Saunders Coin
Shop at 432 Twenty-fifth Street in Ogden, Utah was robbed
by two gunmen.

One Dennis Scott, who was running the

store while the owner was on vacation, was the sole
occupant. (R.4)

The robbers took an assortment of gold

and silver coins.

There was no resemblance between

either of the robbers and defendant Plum and none is
claimed.

Witness Scott couldn't identify any of the

individual coins, only the type of coins and type of
packaging. (R.12, 13 and 16)

On July 7th, about 1:30 P.M., the defendant entered
the Rust Coin and Gift Shop at 311 South Main Street in Salt
Lake City with a satchel of coins.
by Mr. Rust in Mr. Plum's presence.

The coins were inventoried
After inventorying the

coins, Mr. Rust made Mr. Plum an offer in the sum of
$2,850.00 for the coins. (R.66-67)

Mr. Plum said he would

check the offer and return, which he did in about two hours.
At Mr. Rust's request, he left the coins overnight and said he
would be in to pick up a check the next morning.

Mr. Rust's

shop had had a telephone call two days before notifying them
of the coin robbery in Ogden and Mr. Rust noted that some of
the coins were similar to the list from the Ogden robbery,
however, other than this call, as a coin dealer, he had no
reason to believe these coins were or might have been stolen.
(R.80)
On the next date, July 8th, Mr. Plum appeared at
the Rust Coin Shop, was given his check for $2,850.00 by Mr.
Rust and was arrested by Officer Peck for receiving stolen
property.

Mr. Saunders was there at the time and tentatively

identified some of the coins as a portion of the coins that
had been taken from his shop, although Mr. Saunders testimony indicates he had not finished his inventory on the
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8th of July.

Mr. Plum was cooperative with the officers,

told them where he got the coins, gave them a description
of the person that he had received them from, where the
person had told him the coins came from, to wit, a
collection of his and his grandfather's.

Mr. Plum gave

Officer Peck a description of the person that he bought
the coins from and told him that he bought them from him
for $2,600.00. Officer Peck was not satisfied with the
description is the reason that he gave for the arrest.
In addition to Mr. Rust's testimony that he had
no reason to believe that the coins were stolen other than
the telephone call which had been received by his girl two
days after the robbery. (H.77-80)

Mr. Terry Pantelakis

testified (R.150 et. seq.) that he is a licensed coin
dealer; that on the morning of July 7th, a person answering the description given by Mr. Plum of the person that
he bought the coins from came in and tried to sell him
the coins which are in evidence which he identified as
being similar to a portion of the coins that the man tried
to sell him on July 7th.

His description fit the descrip-

tion given to Mr. Plum to Officer Peck.
$2,300.00 for them,

He offered the man

the man didn't want that, and he
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offered him $2,500.00.

(R.162)

Pantelakis further

testified that none of the coins were unusual and he had
no reason to believe them to have been stolen or probably
stolen at the time he made the offer of $2,500.00.
Mr. Leo Van Komen testified that he was an agent
or employee of Mr. Pantelakis and also described the person
who had come in with the coins and indicated that he might
go down to see Porky Plum at The Name Of The Game to try
to sell the coins. He also had no reason to believe that
the coins were stolen.

Defense, in discussion with the

court and prosecutor in chambers prior to starting the
evidence, discussed the misjoinder of two crimes, to wit,
receiving stolen property knowing the coins to have been
stolen, and receiving stolen property believing the coins
to have probably been stolen, and made a formal motion
thereon by agreement after the testimony had started at
the first recess. (R.et. seq.)
Counsel also made a motion for a directed
verdict on the basis of the information alleging two
crimes, which motion was denied by Judge Hall at the end
of the evidence.
verdicts:

1.

The case went to the jury on three

Stating Mr. Plum to be guilty of knowingly
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receiving stolen property as alleged in the information.
2.

On Mr. Plum being guilty of receiving stolen property

believing the property to have probably been stolen.
a basis of not guilty.

3.

On

The jury, after due deliberation,

returned with the middle verdict which, in effect, constitutes a finding of not guilty as to the knowingly been
stolen charge.
POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
76-408, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AMENDED BY
THE LAWS OF UTAH 1975 is VOID FOR VAGUENESS, STATING TWO
CRIMES THEREIN HAVING DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND QUANTUMS OF
PROOF AND NOT INFORMING PERSONS WHO WOULD BE LAW ABIDING
OF THE CRITERION THEY MUST MEET NOT TO VIOLATE THE LAW.
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court in
Musser, et al v. State of Utah 333 US 95 103; 92 LEd 563
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah for determination of whether the statute under which
the case was brought, our old unlawful cohabitation
statute, was void for vagueness.

The Court citing and

discussing it under headnote 1, the language of that
statute states:
-5-

*

"Statutes defining crime run afoul of
the due process clause if they fail to give
adequate guidance to those who would be law
abiding to advise defendants of the nature
of the offense of which they are charged or
to guide courts in trying those who are
accused."

x

After being referred back to the Utah Supreme
Court, this Court in an opinion written by Justice
Latimer determined the language of that statute to be
"void for vagueness" at

Utah

, 175 P.2d 725.

The objectionable language in the Musser case was "to
commit acts injurious to public morals", the court holding that the general language was too broad to either
(a) advise the defendants of the nature of the offense
of which they are being charged or (b) to guide courts
in trying those who are accused.
In the case at bar is "receiving stolen property,
believing

it to have probably been stolen".

The complaint

under which Mr. Plum was initially charged at preliminary
hearing charged him only with having received stolen property belonging to Saunders Coin Shop knowing it to have
been stolen.

The information alleged in the alternative

the two bases knowing it to have been stolen or believing
it to have probably have been stolen.

It would appear

that the framers of the statute Title 76-6-408 made more
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error than the vagueness and ambiguity in putting two
crimes with different criterion of evidence in the same
section then adding three presumptions, none of which is
applicable in this case to suffice for an inference of
"knowledge or belief".

An extensive annotation on vague-

ness or indefiniteness of the statute as rendering it
unconstitutional or inoperative is to be found in
70 LEd 322

and an illustration as to when a statute

defining a criminal offense is subject to attack as
vague, indefinate or uncertain is found in a further
extensive annotation at 83 LEd 893/ Conley v. General
Construction Company at 269 US 70 LEd 322, the case of
Claude C. Conley v. General Construction Company:
"The terms of the penal statute creating
a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject
to what conduct on their part will render
liable to its penalties".
Further, from the same citation at page 323
of the Law Edition citation: ^

»

"Statutes which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates the first essential
of due process of law".
Compare the language complained of in the
information (R.195) "or believing that it probably had been
-7-

stolen and the verdict signed by foreman of the jury
Ronald J. Whitehead: (R.233)
"We the jurors impaneled in the above
case find the defendant Wallace Murphy Plum
aka Porky Plum guilty of theft by receiving
believing said property probably had been
stolen as charged in the information".

.f

POINT TWO

o

}

INSTRUCTION NO- 7 (R.209) AND INSTRUCTION
NO. 10 (R.212) CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE VERDICT RETURNED
BY THE JURY (R.233).

THE COURT IN INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (R.205)

AND INSTRUCTION NO. 8, SUBPARAGRAPH 4 (R.210) GIVES THE
JURY AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED TWO ALTERNATIVES:
(a) THAT THE DEFENDANT "RECEIVED THE PROPERTY INVOLVED
AND KNEW IT WAS STOLEN OR BELIEVED THAT IT HAD PROBABLY
BEEN STOLEN". (Emphasis Added)
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines
probable as follows:
"Having the appearance of truth; having the
character of probability; appearing to be
founded in reason or experience. State v.
Thiele, 119 Iowa, 659 NW 256. Having more
evidence for than against; iTipported by
evidence which inclines the mind to believe,
but leaves some room for doubt; likely".
Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray, Mass 271
distinguishes between knowledge and belief as follows:
-8-

"'Knowledge1 consists in the perception
of the truth of affirmative or negative
propositions, while 'belief admits of all
degrees from the slightest suspicion to the
fullest assurance. The difference between
them is ordinarily merely in the degree, to
be judged of by the court, when addressed
to the court; by the jury, when addressed to
the jury".
The Court defined knowingly in Instruction
No. 9 (R.211) as follows:
"A person engages in conduct 'knowingly'
or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result".
It then defines believing and probably in
Instruction No. 10 (R.212) as follows:
"you are instructed that the work
'believing' means 'having a belief or
opinion.' In other words, 'to believe
that a fact exists.' The word 'probably'
means 'likely to occur, but involving an
element of uncertainty'"
The underlined words cannot be reconciled in
any way with the Court's definition of reasonable doubt
given in Instruction No. 7. (R.209)
The writer has no quarrel with the Court's
definition of knowingly

nor with its definition of

reasonable doubt . Apparently, the jury was unable to
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determine that the defendant knew that it probably was
stolen as they return the verdict unsigned (R.230) and
went on to consider the verdict with the tenuous language,
"Guilty of theft by receiving believing said property
probably had been stolen".
How was it possible in determining the element
of intent and fail to find that the defendant "knew"
property was stolen and yet find beyond a reasonable doubt
a belief that the property had probably been stolen.

In

the face of the definitions given by the court in
Instructions 9 and 10, supra, differentiating between
knowledge and belief is confusing and almost impossible.
The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma has
addressed itself to the same situation in the use of
practically identical words in the case of Weaver v. State,
235 P. 635, wherein reversing a conviction in a receiving
stolen goods case the court states at page 636 of the
Pacific citation:
"The words 'or that she knew such facts
as would lead her to believe it was stolen1
in the first paragraph, and the words 'in all
probability ....that is sufficient as to her
knowledge of it being stolen,1 just preceding
the last paragraph, are erroneous. Pickering
v. U.S., 2 Okl. Cr. 197, 101 P. 123; State v.
Rountree, 80 S.C. 387, 61 S.E. 1072, 22 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 833. See also Davis v. State, 18 Okl
Cr. 112, 193 P.745; McGill v. State, 6 Okl
Cr. 512, 120 P. 297; Price v. State, 9 Okl
Cr. 359, 131 P. 1102".
-10-

and again at page 637 of the same citation:
"There is a further vice in the
instruction above set out, in that the
jury are told not that belief that the
property was stolen would be sufficient
proof of knowledge, but that the existence of facts which would 'lead her to
believe,' or knowledge of facts
as made her believe 'in all probability'
would suffice. This is less than the
law requires, and is erroneous."
It is apparent that the court in that case and
all the cases cited thereunder felt that the jury was
confused by the instructions, but it is to be noted that
in all those cases cited the criterion is to find that the
defendant knowingly violated the law and the question of
belief and probability goes only to the determination of
the elements concerning whether the defendant knew.
POINT III
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT A VERDICT OF EITHER KNOWING THE PROPERTY TO BE
STOLEN OR BELIEVING THAT THE PROPERTY HAD PROBABLY BEEN
STOLEN.
The jury apparently determined that there was
not sufficient evidence to determine the defendant knowingly received stolen property as set forth in Point I,
supra.

A search of the records reveals no evidence that
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would cause the defendant or an ordinarily prudent man
to know or even believe that the property was probably
stolen.

Neither Mr. Plum's actions or the conduct of the

other people show any basis for that determination.

In

fact, the evidence is to the contrary.
The defendant did not attempt to conceal the
property that he brought into the shop of Mr. Rust, a
licensed dealer, in the middle of the day, during regular
business hours and waited while Mr. Rust inventoried the
property.

Although Mr. Rust had known him before, he did

not act differently than usual (R.74), did not appear
nervous or secretive, nor try to keep the coins out of
sight. (R.75)

All of the coins and packaging material

were common in the coin business.

(See Mr. Rust's

testimony R.77 to R.80)
Mr. Plum received Mr. Rust's offer of $2,850.00;
agreed to check with his seller and bring the coins back
later, which he did.

He agreed to leave the coins over-

night and to come back for his money the next day; he
did not object to a check in his name, rather than cash.
(R.79 to R.81)

Other than a telephone call which had

been received by one of Mr. Rust's employees concerning
an Ogden robbery, Mr. Rust, a licensed and long-time coin
dealer, had no reason to believe the coins were stolen.
-12-

(R.80)

Mr. Pantelakis had also inventoried the coins,

which were brought to him on the morning of July 7th by
a person of similar description to Mr. Plum's description
to Officer Peck of the individual from whom he, Mr. Plum,
had received the coins. Mr. Pantelakis offered $2,300.00
and then $2,500.00 for the coins in evidence, together
with others which were not received by Mr. Plum.
Mr. Pantelakis, who had been a coin dealer for
twenty years (R.153) had no reason to believe the coins
to have been stolen at the time he inventoried them. (R.154)
Mr. Plum was cooperative with the police and
answered all appropriate questions asked by Officer Peck
until he was arrested and handcuffed, when he became
uncooperative. (R.86 to R.102)

There is no scentilla of

evidence in the record that defendant was aware that the
Saunders Coin Shop in Ogden had been robbed, nor is there
any evidence that he knew or had reason to believe that the
coins he took to Mr. Rust were probably stolen property.
Why should he know or suspect the coins to be stolen property when two people with long experience in the business,
Mr. Rust and Mr. Pantelakis, had no reason on the same
date to so believe.
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CONCLUSION
The 1973 Utah Legislature on the afternoon of
the last day of the session, passed an entirely new
compilation of our Substantive Criminal Code Title 76
without a complete reading of the 143-page bill and, as
a matter of fact, without the review or final approval
of the committee assigned to rewrite the then existing
code.

This legislation has caused considerable consterna-

tion, much of which this Court has been made aware.
Part of that Code is 76-6-408, entitled
"Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers".

It

will be noted that Paragraph 1 makes a person commit theft
if he receives, retains or disposes of property of another
knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it has
probably been stolen, then and in the same sentence, makes
one guilty of theft who conceals, sells, withholds or aids
in concealing, selling or withholding any such property
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen and
omitting the phrase "or belief that it probably had been
stolen."

The Legislature then goes on in Paragraph 2(a)

(b)(c) and (d) to make certain presumptions upon which
knowledge or belief can be based.

Subparagraphs (a) and

(b) appear to be general, but subparagraphs (c) and(d)
apply to special classifications, to wit, pawnbrokers or
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secondhand dealers.

It would seem clear that the language

of Paragraph 1 is so vague and ambiguous as to leave the
ordinarily prudent person guessing as to when he was
commiting a crime.

This legislation should be declared

void for ambiguity and vagueness.
Even if 77-6-408 were crystal clear, the Court's
instructions were properly excepted to (R.182-183) and
were used as a basis for a motion for a directed verdict.
(R.165-166)

Even the trial court at R.23 in discussing

the problem of alternate crimes with a different, burden
of proof seems to be bothered when it inquired of Mr.
Yocom:
"On your opening statement and I believe
again in your argument now, I think you have
referred to this phrase as deleting the word
probably and merely saying believing that it
had been stolen. And am I correct in that
view? Are you having some difficulty with
the work probably?"
Further, with regard to Point III, an exhaustive
search of the record shows no evidence that Mr. Plum knew
of the robbery in Ogden at the time he disposed of the
coins to Mr. Rust, nor is there any evidence that he had
reason to believe that the coins were stolen.

He paid

$2,600.00 for them; Mr. Pantelakis had offered $2,300.00
then $2,500.00 for the same coins, together with others.
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It is requested that the court find the
statute in itself to be void for vagueness or, in the
alternative, to reverse on the basis of the Court's
instructions 1, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as set forth in Point II
and on the additional basis of the insufficiency of the
evidence.
Respectfully submitted

SUMNER 31 HATCH
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to
Mr. Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General of Utah, Attorney
for Plaintiff-Respondent, Utah State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this
March, 1976.
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